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Introduction
Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General, described sanctions as a ?vital 
tool? in dealing with threats to international peace and security and that they are ?a 
necessary middle ground between war and words.?1?Economic sanctions have been 
favored as a coercive measure by UN members because, compared to other coercive 
measures such as military action, they are less-costly, more convenient in that they 
can be tailored to specific circumstances, and authorized more easily by the UN 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council has imposed economic 
sanctions more than two dozen times to deal with international threats.?The 
objectives of the sanctions vary from ambitious to moderate.?Some target the ending 
of conflicts, reversing aggression, stopping nuclear proliferation and combating 
terrorism.?Others target supporting peace agreements, restoring democracy and 
protecting human rights.
In the early 1990s, the UN, however, experienced adverse humanitarian 
consequences that were directly/indirectly induced by comprehensive sanctions and 
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it was realized that sanctions were a vital but imperfect tool.?Since then the UN has 
reconsidered the objectives, measures and supposed consequences of sanctions.?In 
the mid-1990s, the UN shifted away from comprehensive sanctions to more targeted 
ones that scholars call ?smart sanctions.??Targeted sanctions should be more 
effective as they target specific individuals and entities that have primary responsibility 
for breaching international peace and security, and they should be more humane with 
the purpose of avoiding or reducing damage to the innocent population of a target.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the current situation of smart sanctions 
after about 20 years since the UN first experimented with them.?First, I overview the 
fundamental shifts in the use of UN economic sanctions.?Second, I address the 
problems raised from a human rights perspective by UN sanctions countering 
terrorism.?I deal with the issue at the universal level and inquire into what kind of 
protection the UN system provides to individuals and entities targeted by UN 
sanctions.?Third, I discuss the movement for reform within the UN that has been 
building for years in order to respond to emerging legal challenges and political 
concerns about UN targeted sanctions.?I make a modest attempt to evaluate the UN 
sanctions mechanism for the imposition and implementation of targeted sanctions.
1?Fundamental shift in the use of sanctions
Known as the ?sanction decade,?2 the 1990s was when the UN Security Council 
frequently employed economic sanctions that were directed primarily at intra- and 
inter-state conflicts.?These sanction efforts had ambitious goals and their strategic 
objective was compellence by, for example, reversing the policies of target states.?In 
addition, they were comprehensive in scope and encompassed the totality of a target?s 
economy.?However, the sanctions regimes were poorly implemented leading to 
tremendous economic costs to the target states but often they did not change the 
political behavior of the leaders of those nations.?The economic impact on the states 
in question also had damaging social and humanitarian effects, leading many political 
scientists and researchers to question the morality of economic sanctions as policy 
instruments.3?As a result, the UN started to reconsider the effectiveness, the 
strategic measures, and the objectives of sanctions and shifted from comprehensive to 
targeted ones.
Oudraat analyzes that the fundamental shift in the use of sanctions had three 
dimensions: strategic objectives, instruments, and focus.4?The shift in objectives 
from compellence to deterrence helped improve the record, Oudraat says, as 
compellence is inherently difficult.5?Deterrence is easier because it does not require 
immediate action from those who are deterring and because deterrence requires no 
public action by the one being deterred.?Deterrence aims to maintain the status quo 
 27UN Targeted Sanctions and Human Rights
which is easier than challenging it.6
The shift to targeted sanctions was accompanied by more modest and achievable 
goals such as: discouraging the adoption of threatening policies or behaviors; urging 
targets to constrain proscribed activities; sending particular signals to targets; asking 
targets to consolidate the implementation of peace agreements; urging them to defend 
human rights norms; and, demanding that they prevent the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.?In particular, the fight against terrorism became a top priority for 
the UN after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
The shift contributed to an improved track record of sanction efforts.?Targeted 
sanctions, by virtue of their limited nature, are easier to implement than comprehen-
sive sanctions and political support for targeted sanctions is easier to mobilize since 
these sanctions target only those directly responsible for dangerous behavior.?
Accordingly, sanctions efforts were redirected from conflicts to terrorism.7
1-1?Lessons from adverse humanitarian effects
In the early 1990s, there were three sanctions regimes in particular that were 
ambitious and broad in scope: the comprehensive sanctions imposed against Iraq in 
1990 because of its invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait;8 those against the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ?FRY? in 1992,9 in response to its involvement 
in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and which were extended in 1994 because of FRY?s 
actions against the Bosnian Serbs;10 and, those imposed on the military junta in Haiti 
in 199411 because of its reversal of the 1991 election results.12
In all three cases, the sanctions led to deterioration in the economic and social 
conditions in the countries concerned but did not lead to changes in the behaviors of 
the political leaders.?As a result of growing concern over the humanitarian impact of 
comprehensive sanctions, the Security Council stopped imposing them and turned 
exclusively to the use of financial, diplomatic, arms, aviation, travel and commodity 
sanctions that targeted the combatants and policymakers who were most responsible 
for reprehensible policies.
Regarding the poor record of the comprehensive sanctions of the early 1990s,13 as 
Oudraat points out, broad international support was lacking, either because of 
disagreement over the objectives to be achieved or because there was no country that 
would take the lead.14?And these sanction regimes resulted in great social and human 
costs that were politically difficult to sustain over a long period of time.?In particular, 
the use of military force in each case produced worse humanitarian consequences and 
social turmoil.15
1-2?Formulating ?smart sanctions?
The reasons behind the poor record of comprehensive sanctions fueled the 
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search for targeted sanctions which was led by US-based scholars in the early-1990s.16?
Targeted sanctions, also known as ?smart sanctions,? usually consist of travel bans, 
asset freezes, and embargoes or regulations on strategic goods such as diamonds and 
timber which can be used to purchase weapons by juntas and terrorists.?It was only 
in the late 1990s that the UN started discussions over targeted sanctions.?Such 
discussions were strongly backed by research institutions.17
The revision of comprehensive sanctions had been promoted separately by 
scholars and UN policymakers.?But these separate approaches gradually merged 
through a series of international policy seminars that were organized to assess and 
refine the notion and scope of targeted sanctions.?In order to initiate change, the 
Swiss government hosted seminars named the ?Interlaken Process,?18 in 1998 and 
1999, mainly to discuss financial sanctions.?These consist of the freezing of funds or 
other financial assets and economic resources that are owned or controlled by 
designated persons or entities.?These measures are regarded as preventive in 
nature.?In 2000, the German government and the Bonn International Center for 
Conversion organized an expert seminar called the ?Bonn-Berlin Process,?19 to discuss 
arms embargoes and aviation bans which were regarded as appropriate for smart 
sanctions as they would result in less harm to innocent people.?And during 2001 and 
2002 expert seminars named the ?Stockholm Process? were hosted by the Swedish 
government and Uppsala University to reflect on previous seminars and discuss how 
to ensure that UN members and related actors could implement UN targeted 
sanctions.20.
The series of policy seminars were closely related with the mainstreaming of 
human rights in the UN.?The dissemination of universal values such as respecting 
human rights and promoting democracy under the norms of ?Human Security? and 
?Responsibility to Protect? played an important role in formulating ?humane? targeted 
sanctions.?Some western scholars also stressed the necessity of introducing 
?morality? and/or ?ethics? when formulating sanctions quoting the principles of the 
?Just War Doctrine? when analyzing economic sanctions.?Some created new versions 
of the doctrine to analyze economic sanctions.?These revised versions asked UN 
policymakers to stop and rethink about any unintended consequences that may result 
from sanctions.?All these efforts were attempts to mitigate any adverse humanitarian 
consequences of sanctions.
Today, UN sanctions are, in general, targeted sanctions yet they still produce 
unintended consequences.?The most common unintended consequences include 
corruption and criminality ?58%?, humanitarian consequences ?44%?, a decline in the 
credibility and/or legitimacy of the UN Security Council ?37%?, a strengthening of 
authoritarian rule ?36%?, and resource diversion ?34%?.21
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2?Current targeted sanctions
Today, all UN sanctions are targeted sanctions in some way.?By isolating 
violators of international standards and laws, even modest sanctions measures can 
serve an important symbolic purpose.?The threat of sanctions can be a powerful 
means of deterrence and prevention.?The UN nonproliferation sanctions, for 
example, send signals not only to the targeted states such as the Democratic People?s 
Republic of Korea ?DPRK? but also to other regimes who may be contemplating 
violating their Non-Proliferation Treaty ?NPT? commitments.
2-1?Sanctions on individuals and entities
Since 1991, the UN Security Council has employed an average of one sanction per 
year and so far 25 regimes are in place with more than a thousand designations 
worldwide.22?More than 60% of all the targeted sanctions are against individuals and 
entities.23
Today, sanctions are adopted as one form of diplomatic tool.?Sending a strong 
message is one of the important functions of targeted sanctions.?A signal can be sent 
simultaneously to more than one target which can prevent similar activities by other 
suspicious individuals or entities.24?The signaling functions of targeted sanctions 
include the process of naming, shaming, and/or stigmatizing a target.?These are 
used for the enforcement of prevailing norms such as compliance with NPT 
obligations, for the negotiation of the operational meaning of norms such as Human 
Security and the Responsibility to Protect, and for the articulation of a preference in 
the hierarchy of norms.?The UN signals in the form of collective shame can function 
as a preventive diplomatic tool.
Bierstecker proposes analyzing targeted sanctions as signals from two different 
aspects: ?1? the communication of a message from a sender; and, ?2? the context or 
social domain of its reception by the target.25?According to Bierstecker, with regard 
to the communications aspect, a signal must be correctly received by the target just as 
the sender intended.?A signal needs to be clearly articulated, communicated, 
received and comprehended by the target.?The social domain in which the message 
is received determines whether the signal communicated produces a sense of shame 
or of stigma in the target.
The UN has used targeted sanctions to name well over a thousand individuals and 
corporate entities since 1991.?A sanctions committee creates a list of the target 
individuals and corporations and travel bans or asset freezes and so on are then 
imposed against the persons on the list.?Nearly half of the total names designated 
have been added by the Al-Qaeda/Taliban United Nations Security Council Resolution 
?UNSCR? 1267 Committee ?the so-called 1267 Committee? alone.26?This was divided 
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into two separate sanctions committees in June 2011.?More recently, related to the 
DPRK?s nuclear test on 6 January 2016, the Non-Proliferation Committee has released 
the list of individuals and entities that are the targets of a travel ban and asset freeze.27
This listing measure was first introduced in the sanctions regime of Angola ?the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola: UNITA?.28?The clearest 
indication of naming and shaming in the listing was observable in this case when the 
sanctions committee chair, former Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler, publicly 
named the ruling African heads of state that were assisting Jonas Savimbi and UNITA 
with the purchase of Angolan diamonds in exchange for arms.
The strategic approach by the Angola sanctions regime was evaluated as effective 
in sending a strong signal and improving the implementation of the regime.29?One 
important factor that enhances the clarity of listing and the effect of the signal sent by 
naming and shaming is the degree of consensus within the Security Council.?In this 
case it was relatively easy for the Permanent Five ?P5? members of the Council to 
reach a consensus because none of the P5 had a particular strategic interest in Angola.?
Since the Angola case, listing and naming and shaming has been introduced into UN 
targeted sanctions against other African nations.
2-2?Listing/delisting and human rights
When targeted sanctions were first introduced in the early 1990s, the Security 
Council considered only sovereign heads of state and/or political/military leaders and 
elites.?The Council did not consider the rights of targeted individuals.
The widespread application of targeted sanctions in support of counter-terrorism 
measures since 2001 has raised the most questions about their potential violation of 
individual human rights.?UNSCR 1267 was a measure that was designed to put 
pressure on the Taliban regime to hand over Usama bin Laden for the attacks on two 
US embassies in East Africa in August of 1998.?The resolution was unusual in the 
sense that it named an individual in the text of the resolution, Usama bin Laden, even 
though he was technically not initially the target of the sanctions.
A widespread extension of the asset freeze and travel ban on individuals 
designated as financial supporters of Al-Qaeda immediately followed the attacks of 11 
September 2001.?Bierstecker describes the period from late 2001 through the first 
half of 2002 as an extraordinary period due to insufficient investigation of targeted 
individuals.?During the period, the names of individuals that the US proposed were 
added to the list with little or no questioning or opposition.?As a result, many legal 
issues emerged and the implementation of Security Council targeted sanctions was 
challenged by individual Member States.30 
The largest number of designations has been made by the 1267 Committee 
which, as of 23 October 2009, had designated 504 individual and entities: 397 
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individuals ?255 associated with Al-Qaeda and 142 associated with the Taliban? and 
107 entities associated with Al-Qaeda.31
Targeted sanctions are principally intended to be political and preventive 
measures, rather than punitive ones.?Inclusion on a list is not a legal determination 
but rather a political finding of association with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.?A 
committee does not require evidentiary standards associated with legal prosecutions. 
Nonetheless, the open-ended nature of their application by UN sanctions committees, 
combined with the potential violation of elements of due process in their application to 
individuals, have led to legal challenges about their punitive nature. 
3?Emerging legal challenges and political concerns
The measures implemented through targeted sanctions are under significant and 
growing challenge.?National and regional courts have increasingly found fault with 
the procedures used for listing designations of sanctions on individuals and entities, as 
well as with the adequacy of procedures for challenging designations.?This is an 
unintended consequence of UN targeted sanctions.?Human rights advocates have 
criticized the UN, contending that the prevailing UN procedures for making 
designations violate the fundamental norms of due process.?National legislative and 
parliamentary assemblies also question the authority of their executive officials to 
implement UN targeted sanctions without their consent.?As a result, a number of 
Member States have found themselves in the difficult position of being forced to 
choose between contravening the rulings of their domestic courts and decisions of 
their legislative bodies on the one hand, and their obligations to implement binding 
Chapter VII decisions of the UN Security Council on the other.
Although the most potent challenges come from the courts, the issue is not 
exclusively a legal one.?There is a political problem associated with the legitimacy, 
not only of the instrument of targeted sanctions, but increasingly of actions taken 
under Chapter VII by the UN Security Council.?This is a fundamental challenge to an 
essential instrument of the international community to counter threats to international 
peace and security.
There is no inherent contradiction between the defense of fundamental human 
rights and the maintenance of international peace and security.?The UN Charter 
accords primacy to both goals in Article 1 with the statement of the fundamental 
purposes of the organization.?The Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-
Terrorism and Human Rights came to a similar conclusion in its February 2009 
report,32 acknowledging the necessity of countering terrorism, but pointing out the 
need to do so whilst maintaining human rights standards.?A broad international 
consensus on this point already exists, as manifested by the UN General Assembly?s 
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Global Counter-Terrorism strategy which calls upon all Member States not only to 
undertake measures to counter terrorism, but to do so ?in accordance with the Charter 
of the UN and the relevant provisions of international law, including international 
standards of human rights.?33
The issue of UN targeted sanctions designations continues to be framed by both 
policy practitioners and external observers in terms of a trade-off between security and 
human rights.
The report ?Strengthening Targeted Sanctions through Fair and Clear 
Procedures,? known as the ?Watson Report,?34 recommended that the Security Council 
improve the four principal aspects of due process: notification, access, fair hearing, 
and effective remedy.
The Security Council has made reforms to improve the fairness and transparency 
of sanctions regimes since 2006.?But legal challenges in national and regional courts, 
concerns in parliamentary assemblies, and criticism from human rights organizations 
still continue.?The political problem has only grown worse, with criticism expanding 
beyond measures to counter terrorism to criticism of targeted sanctions in general.
3-1?Legal challenges at the regional and national levels
The present study on UN targeted sanctions is focused on financial sanctions on 
individuals and entities administered by the 1267 Committee.?Since most of the other 
UN targeted sanctions committees have relied on the 1267 Committee?s precedents, 
the tasks and procedures of this Committee are representative of the practices of other 
sanctions committees.
More than 30 legal challenges to UN Security Council targeted sanctions listings 
have been pursued in courts worldwide over designations made either by the 1267 
Committee or in the context of the implementation of UNSCR 1373.35?Some of the 
cases have been dropped after individuals were delisted by the 1267 Committee.
For an individual, being placed on a sanctions list is relatively easy but to be 
removed is much more difficult.?While protection ex-ante ? particularly the right to 
be informed and to be heard before interference with a person?s rights actually occurs 
? is practically non-existent, protection ex-post does not yet offer affected individuals 
or entities an appropriate remedy for effectively challenging, within a reasonable time 
from their adoption, the restrictive measures imposed against them.36
?1?UN sanctions before the European Court of Justice
The most highly visible decision to date was made by the highest court in the 
European Union, the European Court of Justice ?ECJ?, which decided in favor of two 
legal challenges on 3 September 2008 and disaffirmed the European Union regulation 
implementing UNSCR 1267 with specific reference to the two cases.?In its judgments 
in the cases of Kadi and Al Barakaat,37 the Court distinguished between the imposition 
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of the sanctions by the 1267 Committee and the implementation of the sanctions at the 
EU level, holding that the latter are bound by fundamental rights when implementing 
the sanctions, and that they must ensure that the individuals have the right to be 
informed of the reasons for listing and the right to contest those reasons.?The ECJ 
granted that the EU Regulation implementing the UN listing would become void.
The Court charged that the rights of the defense, in particular the right to be 
heard and the right to an effective judicial review of those rights, were patently not 
respected.?The EU subsequently applied the procedures it typically employs for EU 
autonomous sanctions, informing the two plaintiffs of the reasons for their designation 
and giving them an opportunity to respond.?Then, the EU Commission decided to 
re-instate the designations of both.
There was serious concern at the time, however, that if Europe set a precedent by 
selectively implementing decisions by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, it would pave the way for other national and regional bodies to 
do the same.?This would mean undermining the ability of the international 
community to impose and implement targeted measures with consistency across 
different jurisdictions.38?Human rights lawyers charge that the implementation of UN 
targeted sanctions against individuals may violate fundamental human rights, as 
protected by regional or global conventions.39
?2?UN sanctions and national courts
The individuals and entities targeted by UN sanctions should receive adequate 
protection through the international monitoring mechanisms under existing human 
rights treaties.?At the universal level, Ciampi mentions the necessity of including the 
Human Rights Committee ?HRC?, a body created by the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and at a regional level the European Convention of Human 
Rights.
In 2008, the HRC delivered its opinion related to Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck, 
both Belgian nationals and residents, and, respectively, the director and secretary of 
Fondation Secours International, the European branch of an Islamic charity based in 
Illinois, US, that had been on the Consolidated List since 22 October 2002.40?
According to information provided by Belgium, criminal investigations of Sayadi and 
Vinck had started but, although they were subject to a travel ban and asset freeze, 
they were not given access to the relevant information justifying their listing.?In 
February 2005, a Belgian civil court ordered the Belgian state to initiate the procedure 
to have their names removed from the list.?In pursuance thereof, Belgium requested 
the committee to delist the authors.?The criminal investigation was dismissed in 
December 2005.41?Kadi reported this matter to the HRC in 2006 and the report was 
accepted by the committee.?And finally in 2009 the names were delisted from the 
sanctions list by the judgement of the Security Council.42
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This case is a peculiar one as Sayadi and Vinck were listed on the basis of 
information provided by their national state, which was later unable to obtain the 
removal of their names from the list because of the objections of some of the 
committee members.
For due process against individuals listed due to UNSCR 1267, Reich says that 
the series of policy seminars in early 2002 ? the Interlaken Process, the Bonn-Berlin 
Process, and the Stockholm Process ? may have been useful for paving the way to 
such conclusive legal challenges.?This is because UN policymakers and scholars 
strove to develop a legal framework within international law to combine the 
effectiveness of an approach vested in the UN with respect for fundamental rights.43
3-2?Growing political concerns among Member States
The issue of UN targeted sanctions has now gone beyond legal challenges and 
has spilled over into parliamentary debates and motions to limit the ability of Member 
States to implement UN sanctions under certain conditions.?The UK Supreme Court, 
for example, has raised questions about the authority of the UK government to 
implement UN targeted sanctions against individuals without Parliamentary approval 
via primary legislation.44?Germany derided the application of targeted sanctions and 
other UN Member States have indicated a growing reluctance to add names to the 
lists of individuals and entities targeted by Security Council sanctions because of these 
concerns.?More than 50 Member States have expressed concern about the lack of 
due process and absence of transparency associated with listing and delisting.45
Moreover, the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and 
Human Rights issued a report in 2009 titled ?Assessing Damage, Urging Action? which 
strongly criticized the listing system as ?unworthy? of international institutions like 
the UN and EU.46
The legal issues and human rights concerns are significant but, as the 2009 
Watson Report points out, need to be placed in a broader political context.47?Virtually 
all of the major legal challenges to date have stemmed from designations associated 
with efforts to counter terrorism, but not those associated with the enforcement of 
peace agreements, human rights violations, or nuclear proliferation.48?Global 
terrorism has been characterized by the UN Security Council as a threat to 
international peace and security, and targeted sanctions have been imposed against 
individuals and entities as both preventive and deterrent measures.?The growing 
negative reaction to targeted sanctions for counter terrorism purposes, however, risks 
the further erosion of the credibility and future utility of the instrument of multilateral 
sanctions in general.
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4?Developments and procedural improvements within the UN
The movement for reform within the UN has been building for years.?The High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change appointed by former UN Secretary-
General Annan noted in 2004: ?The way entities or individuals are added to the 
terrorist list maintained by the Council and the absence of review or appeal for those 
listed raises serious accountability issues and possibly violates fundamental human 
rights norms and conventions.?49
The 2005 World Summit Outcome document called on the Security Council ?to 
ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on 
sanctions lists and removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exceptions.?50
In response, Annan directed the Office of Legal Affairs ?OLA? to begin an 
interdepartmental process within the UN to develop proposals and guidelines to 
address such concerns.?The OLA 2006 report argued that the Security Council must 
strive to balance its principal duty of maintaining international peace and security with 
respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of targeted individuals to the 
greatest extent possible.51
Based on the OLA analysis, Annan submitted an informal paper to the Security 
Council titled ?Targeted Individual Sanctions: Fair and Clear Procedures for Listing 
and Delisting,? in which he enumerated basic elements to ensure fair and clear 
procedures.52 
?1?The Establishment of a Focal Point ?UNSCR 1730?
The Security Council called for the Secretary-General to establish a focal point 
within the Secretariat in 2006.53?The creation of the focal point allows petitioners 
seeking delisting to submit requests to the Secretariat; the Secretariat then 
acknowledges receipt of the requests and informs the petitioners on procedures for 
processing delisting requests, forwards the requests to the designating states and 
states of citizenship and residence, and informs the petitioners of the sanctions 
committee?s decision.?The focal point represents an improvement in providing 
accessibility for those listed and is expected to ensure fair and clear procedures exist 
for placing individuals and entities on lists and for removing them as well as for 
granting humanitarian exemptions.54
?2?Further Reform of the 1267 Committee Procedures ?UNSCR 1735?
The Al-Qaeda/Taliban sanctions regime has demonstrated impressive 
institutional development in the past ten years.?UNSCR 1267 contained no provision 
for delisting in 1999 but today it represents the most procedurally advanced of the 
sanctions committees with formalized procedures for delisting.
UNSCR 1735 contained the Security Council?s efforts to improve the fairness and 
transparency of sanctions regimes.55?The resolution elaborated minimal standards 
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for the statements of case, provided for the public release of that information, and 
created a procedure to improve deficiencies in notification.?It also included the first 
measure to require notification of those listed.?Another major change found in 
UNSCR 1735 was that the period of the ?No Objections Procedure? ?NOP? was 
extended from 48 hours to five working days.?This allows more time for a serious 
review of cases which is important for a fair hearing in the listing process.
?3?Expanded Roles of the 1267 Committee ?UNSCR 1822?
The Security Council expanded the 1267 Committee?s role in addressing listing 
and delisting issues through UNSCR 1822.56?UNSCR 1822 contained requirements 
with the potential to drastically change sanctions committee procedures.?First, it 
required a review of all names on the 1267 Consolidated List within two years, and that 
every designation should be reviewed at least every three years.?Second, it required 
the development of narrative summaries for all listings on the committee website and 
an explanation for the inclusion of each name on the list.
The workload associated with the 1822 review has been extraordinary for the 
committee members, national governments and those states responsible for the most 
designations.?Reviewing states are asked to indicate if the listing remains appropriate; 
if not, a delisting request is submitted according to the guidelines.?After replies are 
received from the reviewing states, information is circulated to the committee 
members and the monitoring team for one month to review.?However, the Watson 
Report points out that initial progress was slower than previously hoped for due to the 
significant workload and delays in getting necessary responses from Member States.57
?4?Appointment of an Ombudsperson ?UNSCR 1904?
In order to create a clearer and fairer delisting procedure, UNSCR 1904 
established the system and roles of an Ombudsperson.58?The Ombudsperson, 
appointed by the Secretary-General, should be an eminent individual of high moral 
character, impartiality and integrity with high qualifications and experience in relevant 
fields, such as law, human rights, counter-terrorism and sanctions.?The Office of the 
Ombudsperson receives requests from individuals and entities seeking to be removed 
from the Consolidated List.?The Ombudsperson makes recommendations in 
consultation with Secretary-General to the Security Council on appeals regarding 
committee decisions on delisting.?The person is expected to perform these tasks in 
an independent impartial manner and shall neither seek nor receive instructions from 
any government.?Any final decision on delisting is made by the committee.
Concluding notes
The Security Council has engaged in a continual process of self-assessment and 
reform of its practices with regard to designations, exemptions, and delisting; as 
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indeed it has since the first introduction of targeted sanctions in the mid-1990s.?The 
Security Council has adopted UNSCRs 1730, 1735, 1822, and 1904.
Procedural changes to date generally address concerns about notification and 
improved accessibility, but there have also been improvements in providing elements 
for a fair hearing.?The 2009 Watson Report points out that a completely fair hearing 
in advance of a designation is virtually impossible given the nature of targeted financial 
sanctions in particular.?However, there have been improvements with regard to 
providing elements of a fair hearing, notably with regard to periodic review, extending 
the NOP, transparency, and most significantly, efforts to improve the quality of 
statements of case.59
Individuals and entities targeted by the Security Council have the right to be 
informed of those measures and to know the case against them; they have the right to 
be heard within a reasonable time by the relevant decision-making body; and, the 
right to review by an effective review mechanism.?These elements, along with a 
regular review to mitigate the risks of violating the right to property and related 
human rights, represent the first articulation by UN officials of minimum standards of 
procedural fairness.
In order to protect the human rights of targeted individuals, the UN needs to 
work together with international human rights monitoring bodies such as the UN 
Committee of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.?In relation 
thereto, there is no clear answer as to whether these bodies are capable of protecting 
the rights of targeted individuals and entities when national as well as other 
international institutions have failed to do so.
It is too early for us to judge the UN?s reforms in the reviewing mechanisms of 
targeted sanctions but, unless the Security Council overcomes legal challenges and 
growing political concerns over listing/delisting mechanisms, basic human rights 
cannot be guaranteed in the international community.
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